Most people find that they share the same aspirations

The Tunisian revolution has been exceptional in two ways. First of all, it revealed a discontent of unsuspected magnitude, without prior conspiracy or another, ideological or religious dimension. Then, this revolution is exported very quickly and almost the same in several countries. To also improbable events, economists have been evidence of a surprising reserve, forgetting that there is a whole range of work on the "economic theory of revolution", which analyses are very relevant on at least three points:

The character politically destabilizing for growth. The Tunisia and Egypt first country concerned, are part of the Arab countries whose growth was the strongest and the most regular in the 2000s (before crisis). As early as 1963, an author famous, Mancur Olson, drew the attention on a long growth politically destabilizing aspects: first, it may disrupt the economic structures, which multiplies the number of winners and losers; Second, it gives rise to very optimistic expectations for slowdown, involve painful adjustments; third, it increases the expectations of the population with the Government.

The transformation of popular discontent in revolt of mass in an autocracy is outstanding. According to Gordon Tullock, another author famous, the revolutions are very rare and their chances to win are a priori very low. They can be analyzed as the provision of a public good: an individual knows that it will benefit even if it does not participate in the revolutionary actions - there was no "rational" interest to do so, given the personal risks that this implies. In addition, Governments have by definition an advantage on the use of violence (as long as they assume the consequences). Autocracies can then be reversed that if a dissension within the ruling class, as has happened in Tunisia, Egypt or Libya (though in this case the internal problems in the ruling class were more a consequence than a cause of the initial events).

The unpredictability of the revolutions in autocratic regimes has specific reasons. A third important author, Timur Kuran, inspired by the experience of the Iranian revolution (1978-1979), relies on a clever distinction between private preferences and public preferences to explain why "a spark can set fire to a prairie" (Mao Zedong). In an autocratic regime, display its real preferences is very risky. Individuals will then reveal public preferences "strategic", that is more in agreement with the official thinking. However, when the gap between private preferences and public preferences exceed a certain threshold, a brutal adjustment occurs. The difference between private preferences and public preferences disappears. Most people find that they share the same aspirations. The effect of surprise explained therefore simply by the fact that, in an autocracy, person has correct information on the true preferences of individuals - the Government, the opposition or the population.

There is finally a fourth point, which is not integrated in the theory: the role played by another "revolution", information and multimedia. Already, in the fall of the Berlin wall, it had noted the impact of changed television in East Germany. While cascading effects are not per se of new phenomena. They are explained in General, very simply, by processes of imitation: what a country has managed to do, another can expect to reproduce it. But with the Internet, satellites and sophisticated mobile phones, can now transmit any type of information anywhere. This allows not only to send evidence to the world, but also "live" coordinate the action of the protesters, as armies in operation - and this almost anonymously.